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Dual process models of recognition memory propose two distinct routes for recognizing a
face: recollection and familiarity. Recollection is characterized by the remembering of some
contextual detail from a previous encounter with a face whereas familiarity is the feeling of
finding a face familiar without any contextual details. The Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm
is thought to index the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition
performance. Despite researchers measuring face recognition deficits in developmental
prosopagnosia (DP) through a variety of methods, none have considered the distinct
contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition performance. The present study
examined recognition memory for faces in eight individuals with DP and a group of
controls using an R/K paradigm while recording electroencephalogram (EEG) data at the
scalp. Those with DP were found to produce fewer correct “remember” responses and
more false alarms than controls. EEG results showed that posterior “remember” old/new
effects were delayed and restricted to the right posterior (RP) area in those with DP in
comparison to the controls. A posterior “know” old/new effect commonly associated with
familiarity for faces was only present in the controls whereas individuals with DP exhibited
a frontal “know” old/new effect commonly associated with words, objects and pictures.
These results suggest that individuals with DP do not utilize normal face-specific routes
when making face recognition judgments but instead process faces using a pathway more
commonly associated with objects.
Keywords: prosopagnosia, face recognition, recognition memory, familiarity, recollection, electroencephalogram
(EEG)
INTRODUCTION
Prosopagnosia is a selective face perception disorder character-
ized by an impairment for recognizing faces combined with
intact low level visual processing (Bodamer, 1947). It had been
thought until recently that prosopagnosia was a rare disor-
der, with the vast number of identified cases acquiring prob-
lems with face recognition following some form of brain injury
(Farah, 1990). However, cases with no evidence of neurologi-
cal injury have been identified in recent years (e.g., de Haan,
1999; Duchaine, 2000; Duchaine et al., 2003). These latter cases
have become known as Congenital or Developmental Prosopag-
nosia (DP). It has been suggested that as many as 1 in 40 of
the population meets the criteria for DP (Kennerknecht et al.,
2006), with some cases appearing to run in families (Duchaine
et al., 2007; Grueter et al., 2007). While individuals with DP
exhibit difficulties in recognizing faces, many, but not all, have
been shown to possess normal attractiveness processing (Carbon
et al., 2010), as well as intact recognition abilities for eye gaze
(Duchaine et al., 2009), face emotion (Duchaine et al., 2003;
Humphreys et al., 2007), face motion information (Steede et al.,
2007; Longmore and Tree, 2013) and greebles (artificial objects
designed to be processed holistically like a face; Duchaine et al.,
2004).
Face recognition deficits associated with prosopagnosia have
been studied using a wide variety of methods: forced choice
tasks (e.g., Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006; Rivolta et al., 2012),
familiarity judgments (e.g., Kress and Daum, 2003; Grueter
et al., 2007) or recall tests for semantic information related to
faces such as a name or profession (e.g., Grueter et al., 2007).
Dual process models of recognition memory (e.g., Atkinson
and Juola, 1973, 1974; Mandler, 1980; Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas,
1994) propose that there are two distinct routes with which
one can recognize a previously seen face: familiarity and rec-
ollection. Most of us can relate to the experience of meeting
someone and finding their face familiar but, rather frustratingly,
being unable to remember any details from when or where one
might have met them; this is an example of familiarity based
recognition. Recollection on the other hand is characterized by
remembering some form of contextual detail, such as specific
previous encounters. Traditional dual process models propose
that familiarity can vary in strength whereas recollection is usu-
ally assumed to be an all-or-nothing, high strength memory
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(Yonelinas, 2002; for an alternative perspective on the nature
of recollection, see Donaldson, 1996; Wixted, 2007; Wixted and
Mickes, 2010).
A raft of behavioral, neuropsychological, electrophysiological
and neuroimaging studies have provided evidence in support of
this dissociation between familiarity and recollection (for reviews,
see Yonelinas, 2002; Aggleton and Brown, 2006; Diana et al.,
2007). One behavioral method for dissociating familiarity and
recollection is the Remember/Know (R/K) procedure (Tulving,
1985). Participants are asked to study a series of items and are
then tested on the studied target items along with previously
unknown lures. Participants are required to make judgments of
“Remember”, that is if they could recollect some detail of the
item from study, “Know”, where they knew they had seen the
item in the previous list but could not recollect any details of
its presentation or “New”, an item that was not on the previous
list. It is thought that “remember” responses reflect the recollec-
tion process whereas “know” responses measure the contribution
of familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). This suggests that remember
responses are associated with high confidence due to the high
strength of memory that recollecting details surrounding an item’s
previous occurrence brings (Eichenbaum et al., 2007). Know
responses, however, engender a more pliable level of confidence
due the fact familiarity can vary in memory strength (Eichen-
baum et al., 2007) The R/K procedure has been successful in disso-
ciating recollection and familiarity effects in electrophysiological
(Düzel et al., 1997) and neuroimaging studies (Henson et al.,
1999). The present study is the first to use the R/K paradigm to
study the recognition of previously unknown faces in individuals
with DP.
Traditionally, event related potential (ERP) studies of pictures
(e.g., Tsivilis et al., 2001), objects (e.g., Duarte et al., 2004; Groh-
Bordin et al., 2006) and words (e.g., Curran, 2000; Maratos
et al., 2000) have found familiarity to be associated with early
enhanced positivity over frontal regions between 300–500 ms
after test stimulus onset, whereas later positivity over parietal sites
between 500–700 ms indicates recollection. However, recent ERP
studies examining recognition memory for previously unknown
faces have suggested that familiarity and recollection might differ
temporally and neurally to that of words and objects (Yovel
and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007; Herzmann
et al., 2011). These results contribute to the ample evidence
suggesting that faces are special stimuli processed differently from
other objects (for a review, see McKone and Robbins, 2011).
By using an adapted R/K procedure, Yovel and Paller (2004)
found that familiarity for faces was associated with a parietal
old/new effect between 300–700 ms, whereas recollection for
faces was associated with similar positivity over the posterior
of the scalp, but also some anterior regions during the same
time period. Recollection and familiarity were also found to
be maximal between 500–700 ms after stimulus onset. A study
by MacKenzie and Donaldson (2007) also found spatially and
temporally similar familiarity and recollection ERP effects for
faces. In contrast to these studies, Curran and Hancock (2007)
found face related ERP effects similar to that of words, pictures
and objects. These results might be due to their participants
recognizing face images on the basis of extraneous information
in the images rather than the facial features. In a follow-up study,
Herzmann et al. (2011) showed ERP effects for faces in line with
earlier work cited above when extraneous cues were excluded
from face images. These results suggest that the removal of any
such extraneous cues from face images is important for the study
of face processing and consistent with previous work showing that
general object processing can be dissociated from that of faces
(McNeil and Warrington, 1993; Farah et al., 1995; Moscovitch
et al., 1997).
The present study examines recognition memory for faces in
those with normal face recognition abilities and individuals with
DP in order to determine the relative contributions of recollection
and familiarity to performance in these two groups. Moreover,
the use of electroencephalogram (EEG) measures enables us to
determine the degree to which differences in performance across
these two groups reflect qualitative (rather than just quantitative)
differences in face processing.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eight individuals with DP and 20 control participants took part
in this study. Four of the individuals with DP and 11 of the
control participants were female. The ages of the individuals with
DP ranged from 20–38 years (M = 25.6 years) and that of the
control participants ranged from 18–40 years (M = 24.5 years).
All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. One
of the individuals with DP and 2 of the control participants were
left-handed. Data from 1 control participant was rejected from
all analyses due to behavioral performance appearing to be at
chance levels. Nine controls failed to correctly respond “know” on
enough trials to create reliable ERP waveforms for these responses
and were excluded from the ERP analyses described below (we
confirmed that their ERPs for correct “remember” responses
matched those for the remaining 10 controls and their choice
responses are included in Tables 1–4). The ERPs for the control
group are based on 5 male and 5 female participants between the
ages of 19 and 40 years (M = 27.9) one of which was left handed.
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the departmental
Ethics Committee at Swansea University.
In line with previous researchers (Duchaine et al., 2007;
Bate et al., 2008), we used a battery of neuropsychological tests
Table 1 | Neuropsychological testing results of the 8 DP cases:
Famous Faces Test (FFT), Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT),
Cambridge Face Perception Test upright and inverted (CFPTupr and
CFPTinv).
Participants Age Sex FFT CFMT CFPTupr CFPTinv
(%) z z z
DP1 32 M 66 −2.77 −1.25 1.09
DP2 21 M 60 −2.27 −1.91 0.15
DP3 20 M 63 −2.84 −3.06 −1.47
DP4 38 M 31 −3.24 −3.88 −0.95
DP5 20 F 29 −2.92 −2.24 −0.5
DP6 21 F 26 −3.19 −2.24 −0.8
DP7 21 F 34 −2.15 −0.93 1.8
DP8 32 F 46 −2.99 −3.55 −2.14
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Table 2 | Mean accuracy and proportion of correct and incorrect
responses (with standard errors).
Controls (%) DP Cases (%)
Hits 93 (1.23) 79 (3.42)
False Alarms 22 (2.72) 42 (3.32)
Correct:
Remember 74 (4.46) 52 (5.61)
Know 26 (4.46) 48 (5.61)
Incorrect:
Remember 25 (5.89) 13 (2.74)
Know 75 (5.89) 87 (2.74)
Table 3 | Discriminability (with standard errors).
Controls DP Cases
Discriminability 2.38 (0.16) 1.09 (0.13)
Discriminability:
Remember 2.36 (0.24) 1.45 (0.12)
Know 0.24 (0.17) 0.02 (0.08)
Table 4 | Mean response times (RTs) of correct and incorrect
responses in ms (standard errors).
Controls DP Cases
Correct:
Remember 839 (108) 657 (117)
Know 1420 (180) 1041 (130)
Incorrect:
Remember 1473 (268) 802 (87)
Know 1761 (212) 1032 (155)
(described in detail below) to diagnose DP. Unless noted other-
wise, we took the appropriate norms from the respective research
publications. Table 1 displays the DP cases that participated
in this experiment and their neuropsychological tests of face
processing impairment. The Famous Faces Test (FFT; Duchaine
and Nakayama, 2005) consists of 60 celebrity faces which the
participant is required to name or identify in some way. We
collected FFT data from 164 participants (101 female) using a
shortened FFT (35 faces) in a separate study from the present one
to ascertain normative means and SDs for the general population
in the local geographical area (M = 94.6%, SD = 6.23). As can
be seen from Table 1, all of the DP cases were severely impaired
at recognizing famous faces. The Cambridge Face Memory Test
(CFMT; Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006) requires the participant
to memorize six target faces presented in a number of different
views; these faces must then be identified when displayed individ-
ually with two distractor faces. We only recruited DP cases that
showed an impairment of two SDs or more below the mean in
both the CFMT and FFT. During the Cambridge Face Perception
Test (CFPT; Duchaine et al., 2007), participants are shown a target
face presented in three-quarter view along with six faces presented
in frontal view; these six faces have been morphed to appear
similar in varying percentages to the target face. Participants are
required to arrange the faces in order of similarity to the target
face. The test displays faces either upright or inverted. As can
FIGURE 1 | Mock-up examples of the male and female face stimuli
used.
be seen from Table 1, five of the DP participants were impaired
on the CFPT with a sixth case approaching 2 SDs below the
mean; it should be noted that a diagnosis of prosopagnosia is not
reliant upon impairment on this task. We also screened control
participants for prosopagnosia by administering the CFMT and
confirmed that all z-scores were within the normal range (−1.5–
1.4, M =−0.36).
STIMULI
Experimental stimuli consisted of 324 photographic bitmap
images of faces, half of which were male. Figure 1 shows mock-
up examples of two such stimuli. All faces were unknown to
the participants. The faces were presented in the center of a
black background on a 14′′ color monitor. The stimuli subtended
horizontal and vertical visual angles of approximately 3.9◦ and
5.4◦ respectively. In addition, each face was masked to remove the
original background, hair, and ears, i.e., cues that could lead to
recognition not based upon the face itself. Luminance of each face
was homogenized for the same purpose.
PROCEDURE
Following application of electrodes (described below), partici-
pants were seated on a comfortable chair in a dimly lit booth.
The participants faced a computer screen at a distance of
approximately 90 cm, with the response buttons placed com-
fortably within reach to record responses. Participants were fully
instructed prior to a practice session consisting of a study and
test phase. Before the beginning of any study or test phase, the
instructions for each task were repeated to remind participants
as to what was required. Between phases, participants were also
reminded to remain as still as possible and to fixate centrally
throughout stimulus presentation.
The experiment was comprised of 27 blocks of study and test
lists. At study participants were asked to remember the faces as
best they could and were told that their memory for the faces
would be tested in a subsequent test phase. In each study phase
participants viewed four repetitions of six face images (half of
which were male) for a total of 24 trials. Presentation of the
face images was random subject to the constraint that all six
faces had to be presented before the next round of repetitions
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and that no faces repeated across blocks. Each trial consisted
of a white fixation cross presented for either 450 or 550 ms,
followed by the presentation of a face image for 2500 ms. A 500 ms
blank screen then followed prior to the presentation of the next
trial.
All faces displayed during the previous study phase, and the
six new faces were presented in a random order at test (subject to
the constraint that no faces repeated across blocks). Participants
were asked to decide whether each face had been presented in
the previous study phase, or not, by pressing “remember” if they
could remember specific details from the study phase, “know” if
they thought the face was encountered in the previous study phase
but without remembering any details, or “new” with the first three
fingers of their dominant hand (the mapping between buttons
and responses was counterbalanced across all participants). Each
trial consisted of a white fixation cross presented for either 450 or
550 ms, followed by the presentation of a face image for 2000 ms.
Following the face, a white fixation cross would appear again
for 150 ms and then a screen prompting participants to respond
“remember”, “know” or “new” would appear; this screen would
remain on screen until a response was made. Participants could
not respond until this response prompt screen had appeared.
After a response was made, another fixation screen would appear
for 150 ms followed by another screen prompting participants to
rate on a scale of 1–6 how confident they were of their previous
response.
EEG RECORDING
We recorded electrophysiological data throughout the experi-
ment. The recording at scalp was taken from 128 Ag-AgCl “active”
electrodes set in an elastic Biosemi (Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
cap. Each electrode was set within the cap in equidistant con-
centric circles from the 10 to 20 position Cz (Jasper, 1958).
The horizontal electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from
electrodes placed on the outer canthi of each eye. The vertical
EOG was recorded from an electrode placed below the left eye.
The EEG was recorded referenced to a common mode sense
(CMS) electrode, and then re-referenced offline to a common
average reference through the use of Brain Electrical Source
Analysis (BESA) software (MEGIS software GmbH, Graefelfing,
Germany). All electrode channels were band pass filtered from
0.01 to 40 Hz. The analogue signal was digitally sampled at a
rate of 512 Hz. ERPs were time locked to the presentation of
stimuli, with an epoch that began 200 ms prior to stimulus onset
and lasted for 1000 ms post-stimulus. Epochs found to contain
EOG artifacts exceeding ±100 µV were rejected from analysis,
as were trials where drift from baseline (difference between first
and last data point) was greater than 50µV. We retained data only
from those participants with at least 20 remaining trials in each
of the experimental conditions of interest. Blink artifacts were




Table 2 displays the percentage of hits, that is the correct iden-
tification of a studied face as studied, from the control and DP
participants. Between samples t-tests comparing the two groups
revealed significant differences for the hits [t(25) = 4.52, SE = 2.89,
p = 0.009], suggesting that the control participants were better
at identifying studied faces as having been previously seen when
compared to the individuals with DP. The mean proportion of
response types for hits for the controls and those with DP are also
shown in Table 2. A mixed within-between subject ANOVA of
Group (DP, control) × Response (“remember”, “know”) revealed
a significant Group× Response interaction [F(1,25) = 7.84, MSE =
5363.29, p = 0.01] and a significant effect of Response [F(1,25) =
10.74, MSE = 7346.11, p = 0.003]. Paired samples t-tests revealed
that the control participants made significantly more “remember”
than “know” responses when correctly identifying an old face
as previously seen [t(18) = 5.315, SE = 8.91, p < 0.001], and
no significant differences in response proportions for individuals
with DP [t(7) = 0.332, SE = 11.22, p = 0.75]. Between samples t-
tests revealed significant differences between the individuals with
DP and control participants in their proportion of “remember”
responses [t(25) = 2.8, SE = 7.79, p = 0.01]. These results show that
when control participants correctly identified previously studied
faces, they did so more frequently using “remember” responses
than individuals with DP.
Table 2 also displays the percentage of false alarms, that is
the incorrect identification of a previously unknown lure face as
studied, from the control and DP participants. Between samples t-
tests comparing the two groups revealed significant differences for
the false alarms [t(25) = −4.21, SE = 4.73, p < 0.001], suggesting
that the DP participants were more likely to identify an unstudied
face as studied in comparison to the controls. Also displayed
in Table 2 is the mean proportion of incorrect identification
of test faces as studied (false alarms). A mixed within-between
subject ANOVA of Group (DP, control)×Response (“remember”,
“know”) revealed a significant effect of response [F(1,25) = 44.26,
MSE = 43514.79, p < 0.001]. Paired samples t-tests revealed that
both groups were more likely to incorrectly identify a previously
unknown face as being studied using a “know” response rather
than a “remember” response [t(18) = 4.247, SE = 11.78, p< 0.001,
and t(7) = 13.568, SE = 5.48, p < 0.001], for control participants
and individuals with DP respectively.
Table 3 displays the mean discriminability (hits—false alarms;
Donaldson, 1996). A discriminability score of 0 corresponds to
no discrimination between studied and new items. A between
samples t-test revealed significant differences in discriminability
between the DP and control participants [t(25) = 4.98, SE =
0.25, p < 0.001]. This suggests that individuals with DP found
it harder than controls to discriminate between old and new
faces. Between samples t-tests also revealed that for “remem-
ber” responses, control participants were more effective than
those with DP at discriminating old and new faces [t(25) =
2.78, SE = 0.35, p = 0.01], whereas we found no difference
in discriminability for “know” responses [t(25) = 0.82, SE =
0.27, p = 0.42]. One sample t-tests revealed that “remember”
responses significantly discriminated old and new faces [t(18) =
11.11, SE = 2.42, p < 0.001, and t(7) = 12.48, SE = 1.45, p <
0.001], for the control and DP participants respectively. Neither
group, however, reliably discriminated old and new faces when
responding “know” [t(18) = 1.43, SE = 0.24, p = 0.169, and t(7) =
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0.392, SE = 0.35, p = 0.78], for the control and DP participants
respectively.
The response times for correct “remember” and “know”
responses across the two groups are displayed in Table 4. A
mixed within-between subject ANOVA of Group (DP, control) ×
Response (“remember”, “know”) revealed a significant Group ×
Response interaction [F(1,25) = 12.86, MSE = 2622262.51, p =
0.001]. Within groups t-tests revealed that control participants
and individuals with DP responded significantly faster with
“remember” than “know” for previously studied faces [t(18) =
−3.46, SE = 169.75, p = 0.003, and t(7) = −4.919, SE = 78.04, p =
0.002, respectively]. There were no significant response time dif-
ferences between the two groups for correct “remember” [t(25) =
0.99, SE = 183.24, p = 0.23], and correct “know” [t(25) = 1.29, SE =
292.85, p = 0.21], responses.
Table 4 also displays the incorrect “remember” and “know”
responses across the two groups. A mixed within-between sub-
ject ANOVA of Group (DP, control) × Response (“remember”,
“know”) revealed no significant effects of Response [F(1,25) =
2.53, MSE = 729116, p = 0.126], or Response × Group [F(1,25) =
0.032, MSE = 9306, p = 0.86]. Pairwise comparisons revealed
no significant differences between response times for incorrect
“remember” responses across groups [t(23) = 1.68, SE = 0.400, p =
0.11], but individuals with DP made incorrect “know” responses
significantly faster than the control participants [t(25) = 2.148,
SE = 322, p = 0.04]. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the cor-
rect “remember” responses were faster than incorrect “remember”
responses in the control group [t(16) = 3.16, SE = 208, p = 0.006],
but not the DP group [t(7) = 1.11, SE = 131, p = 0.3]. There were
no significant differences between response times for correct vs.
incorrect “know” responses in either the controls [t(18) = 1.38,
SE = 221, p = 0.18], or DP group [t(7) = 0.128, SE = 68, p = 0.9].
Overall, the pattern of performance for the two groups in this
task suggest that (a) recognition memory for faces in individuals
with DP was clearly impaired relative to the control partici-
pants; (b) control participants showed the typical pattern of a
greater proportion of “remember” than “know” responses (con-
sistent with other work: Yovel and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie and
Donaldson, 2007, 2009); whilst (c) individuals with DP showed
no preference for “remember” responses.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RESULTS
ERP effects commonly associated with recognition memory for
faces
For analyses, we divided the central scalp area into four a-priori
regions of interest at time intervals of 300–500 ms and 500–
700 ms (c.f., Yovel and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie and Donaldson,
2007) as recollection and familiarity for faces were previously
found to occur across both these time windows. The main regions
of focus will be across the left and right hemispheres from anterior
(left hemisphere: D2, D12, D13; right hemisphere: C2, B31,
B32) and posterior sites (left hemisphere: D16, D17, D28; right
hemisphere: B2, B18, B19). These electrodes were chosen as they
would capture the enhanced positivity exhibited for familiarity
and recollection of faces as identified by previous research (Yovel
and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007). These sites
would also allow us to examine possible topographical differences
FIGURE 2 | Biosemi electrodes with key Jasper 10–20 locations
overlaid, with left posterior (LP), left anterior (LA), right anterior (RA)
and right posterior (RP) sites highlighted in light gray. Inferior mid left
anterior (ILA) as described from the scalp maps is shown in dark gray.
between where these effects occur in those with DP and intact
face recognition skills. Figure 2 displays the locations of these
electrodes in the Biosemi cap system.
ANOVAs from the four scalp locations
We performed mixed within-between subject ANOVAs with fac-
tors of Correct Response (remember, know, correct rejections),
Location (anterior, posterior), Hemisphere (left, right) and Group
(control, DP) on the data from the 300–500 ms and 500–700 ms
time windows. In the 300–500 ms time window we found a main
effect of Location [F(1,16) = , MSE = 31.71, p = 0.001], and
a significant interaction for Location × Hemisphere [F(1,16) =
12.84, MSE = 7.51, p = 0.002] and Response × Hemisphere ×
Group interaction [F(2,32) = 2.9, MSE = 0.73, p = 0.069]. In
the latter time window (500–700 ms), we found a main effect
of Location [F(1,16) = 20.11, MSE = 43.14, p < 0.001] and
Response [F(2,32) = 6.77, MSE = 7.58, p = 0.004], and a significant
interaction for Location × Response [F(2,32) = 5.29, MSE = 0.97,
p = 0.01], Location × Hemisphere [F(2,16) = 6.6, MSE = 5.71,
p = 0.021], Response×Hemisphere (Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated,
χ2(2) = 7.96, p = 0.019, therefore degrees of freedom were
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε =
0.71)) [F(1.42,22.67) = 3.56, MSE = 1.67, p = 0.059] Response ×
Hemisphere× Group interaction [F(2,32) = 3.48, MSE = 1.16, p =
0.043]. The following sections contain pairwise comparisons that
reveal the causes of these effects.
ERP effects commonly associated with familiarity for faces
Figure 3 shows enhanced positivity over the posterior and ante-
rior scalp regions, particularly over the left hemisphere, for
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FIGURE 3 | Scalp maps (shown as if viewing from above the head) for the voltage corresponding to correct “know” responses minus that for correct
rejections. Data for both groups and time intervals are shown across the four panels.
control participants when they correctly responded “know” com-
pared to correct “new” responses. The DP cases display some faint
positivity over the central and posterior of the scalp across 300–
700 ms, however this positivity appears hugely diminished and
covers less of the scalp anterior in comparison to the controls.
Examining the ERP waveforms in Figure 5, controls appear
to show enhanced positivity for correct “know” responses from
around 200–1000 ms when compared to correct rejections, but
only over the left hemisphere. While DP cases display some
positivity for correct “know” responses from around 300–400 ms
in all scalp areas, this positivity only lasts until 600–700 ms, and is
of smaller magnitude when compared to that of the controls.
Pairwise comparisons at each scalp location from the 300–
500 ms time window revealed that the control group’s correct
“know” [t(9) = 2.39, SE = 0.207, p = 0.038] responses were more
positive than correct rejections at the left posterior (LP) region.
The DP group exhibited no such positivity over any scalp location
in this time period.
In the 500–700 ms time window, pairwise comparisons
revealed that in control participants, ERPs over the LP area for
correct “know” responses were more positive than those for
correct rejections [t(9) = 2.656, SE = 0.254, p = 0.026]. Again, as
in the earlier time window, the DP group exhibited no apparent
“know” old/new effects in any of the four scalp locations. In
addition, we found a significant difference between the groups
when the mean amplitude of ERPs for correct rejection responses
was subtracted from that for correct “know” responses at the LP
site [t(16) = 2.168, SE = 0.382, p = 0.046], suggesting a greater
old/new effect for correct “know” responses in the control
participants in the later time window.
ERPs for correct “know” responses are more positive relative
to that of the correct rejections over the LP region in the con-
trols in both time windows. This suggests that the controls are
experiencing a similar face-specific familiarity old/new effect as
found by previous research (Yovel and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie
and Donaldson, 2007). In contrast, our results suggest that for
individuals with DP, ERPs in the four central scalp regions do
not distinguish between correct “know” responses and correct
rejections; there is no expected face-specific familiarity signal
present in the DP group.
ERP effects commonly associated with recollection for faces
Figure 4 shows that EEG voltage for correct “remember”
responses is more positive than that for correct rejections across
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FIGURE 4 | Scalp maps (shown as if viewing from above the head) for the voltage corresponding to correct “remember” responses minus that for
correct rejections. Data for both groups and time intervals are shown across the four panels.
the whole scalp for both of the two participant groups. This
difference appears maximal over the right hemisphere’s central
area and is more pronounced in control participants than in
individuals with DP.
ERPs for the four main regions of interest are shown in
Figures 5 and 6 for the control and the DP participants respec-
tively. Figure 5 suggests that control participants exhibit enhanced
positivity for correct “remember” responses when compared to
correct rejections from around 200–300 ms until the end of
the epoch at 1000 ms over all four scalp regions. Individuals
with DP also display similar positivity to that of the controls
for correct “remember” responses from around 200 ms until
the end of the epoch in the RP region (Figure 6). This correct
“remember” positivity, however, does not appear in the other
scalp regions until around 300–400 ms after stimulus onset, but
the “remember” old/new effect appears to be of similar magnitude
for both participant groups.
Pairwise comparisons at each scalp location from the 300–
500 ms time window revealed that the control group’s correct
“remember” (t(9) = 4.49, SE = 0.133, p = 0.001) responses were
more positive than correct rejections at the LP region. Correct
“remember” [t(9) = 2.33, SE = 0.126, p = 0.042] responses were
also more positive than correct rejections over the left anterior
(LA) location. We found no correct “remember” old/new effects
at any of the four a-priori scalp locations in the DP group between
300–500 ms.
In the 500–700 ms time window, pairwise comparisons
revealed that correct “remember” responses at LP [t(9) = 3.398,
SE = 0.27, p = 0.008] and RP [t(9) = 3.807, SE = 0.315, p = 0.004]
regions were more positive than correct rejections in the control
group. We also found that ERPs for correct “remember” responses
were more positive than those for correct rejections [t(9) = 2.487,
SE = 0.345, p = 0.042] in the DP group over only the RP of the
scalp.
This pattern of ERPs for control participants is consistent with
previous research finding correct “remember” old/new effects
over posterior and anterior scalp sites between 300–700 ms (Yovel
and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007). The appear-
ance of correct “remember” old/new effects, however, appear to be
delayed in those with DP due to enhanced positivity appearing in
the later time window only. This effect also seems quantitatively
smaller in the DP group when compared to the controls as
indicated by the positivity being restricted only to the RP of the
scalp.
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FIGURE 5 | ERPs of correct “remember” and “know” responses compared to correct rejections from the four scalp locations for the controls.
FIGURE 6 | ERPs of correct “remember” and “know” responses compared to correct rejections from the four scalp locations for the DP cases.
Recollection vs. familiarity
No significant differences were found between correct “remem-
ber” or correct “know” responses in the 300–500 ms time window
for either of the two participant groups.
Further analyses on the controls between 500–700 ms revealed
enhanced positivity for correct “remember” compared to correct
“know” responses at RP [t(9) = 4.667, SE = 0.298, p =
0.001] and right anterior (RA) [t(9) = 2.483, SE = 0.347, p =
0.035] locations. We also found that ERPs for correct “remem-
ber” responses were more positive than “know” [t(7) = 2.84,
SE = 0.27, p = 0.025] responses in the DP group at the RP
location.
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This suggests that recollection is a much stronger signal in
comparison to familiarity in the control group, but only over
the right hemisphere. ERP differences in the DP group were
again restricted to the posterior of the scalp, with this enhanced
positivity for recollection to familiarity appearing only over the
right parietal region of the scalp.
It is possible that differences between the two groups with
regard to significant old/new effects were only due to differential
power to detect these effects (due to different sample sizes and
trial numbers). To rule this possibility out, we repeated the
analyses after removing the two control participants with the
fewest correct “know” responses and then matched the average
trial numbers between the two groups. These analyses revealed
the same pattern of results.
ERP effects commonly associated with familiarity for words and
objects
Visual inspection of Figure 3 suggests the appearance of a frontal
correct “know” old/new effect over the furthermost mid and left
frontal sites in those with DP. Intriguingly, this frontal effect does
not appear in the controls. A “know” old/new effect over frontal
sites between 300–500 ms has previously been associated with
familiarity of objects, pictures and words (e.g., Curran, 2000;
Maratos et al., 2000; Tsivilis et al., 2001; Duarte et al., 2004; Groh-
Bordin et al., 2006), but not generally for faces (Yovel and Paller,
2004; MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007; Herzmann et al., 2011).
Knowing that previous research (Curran, 2000; Maratos et al.,
2000; Tsivilis et al., 2001; Duarte et al., 2004; Groh-Bordin et al.,
2006) has identified this effect as occurring between the frontal
and polarfrontal regions of the scalp, and visually inspecting
where this effect was apparent in our data, we averaged the
electrodes (C17, C18, C19, C27 and C28) to form a post-hoc
region of interest: inferior mid left anterior (ILA). We also created
an additional two regions of interest to more robustly confirm
any possible effects using the exact frontal electrodes (Left Frontal
(LF): C27, C29 and C32; Right Frontal (RF): C16, C14 and C10) as
used by previous research (Duarte et al., 2004). The Duarte et al.
(2004) study was chosen as the authors used visual objects which
appeared to most closely match the stimuli used in the present
study.
Figure 7 displays the ERPs from the ILA region where we
identified the apparent frontal positivity related to correct “know”
responses. The three waveforms for correct responses appear
qualitatively similar within the individuals with DP, suggesting a
similar underlying cognitive process being engaged when making
recognition judgments of a face in DP. Qualitative differences are
clearly apparent when these waveforms from the DP group are
compared to the correct response waveforms from the control
group. Differences such as these suggest that the two groups are
possibly engaging in different cognitive processes when making
face recognition judgments.
To better assess the apparent frontal old/new effect for individ-
uals with DP, and in an effort to look for any possible familiarity
effects normally associated with objects, pictures and words, we
conducted mixed within-between subject ANOVAs on the ILA
region with factors of Correct Response (“remember”, “know”,
“new”) and Group (control, DP) across the 300–500 and 500–
700 ms time windows.
In the 300–500 ms time window over the ILA region, we found
a significant interaction for Response × Group [F(2,32) = 0.126,
MSE = 0.0846, p = 0.022]. Pairwise comparisons revealed that
correct “know” responses at the ILA site [t(7) = 2.88, SE = 0.14,
p = 0.024] were significantly more positive than correct rejections
in the DP group. Conversely, correct rejections were significantly
more positive than the correct “know” responses at this site in the
control group [t(9) = 2.88, SE = 0.073, p = 0.024]. Independent
FIGURE 7 | ERPs of correct “remember” and “know” responses compared to correct rejections in the DP cases (left) and controls (right) from the
inferior mid left anterior (ILA) region associated with familiarity for objects and words.
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samples t-tests revealed that the magnitude of the correct “know”
effect was greater in the DP group than in the controls [t(16) =
3.24, SE = 0.26, p = 0.005]. Repeating these analyses using the
electrodes examined by previous research (Duarte et al., 2004)
confirmed these effects at the LF, but not RF, region.
In the 500–700 ms time period we found a significant inter-
action for Response × Group [F(2,32) = 0.025, MSE = 0.012, p =
0.033]. Paired samples t-tests revealed a positive correct “know”
old/new effect [t(7) = 2.91, SE = 0.29, p = 0.022] in the DP group.
No differences were found between any of the control waveforms
in this time window. Between group comparisons revealed that
this “know” old/new effect was larger in the DP group [t(16) =
2.67, SE = 0.46, p = 0.017]. As with the earlier time window, these
effects were confirmed at the LF, but not the RF, location.
We repeated the analyses after removing the two control par-
ticipants with the fewest correct “know” responses and matching
the average trial numbers between the two groups. We ranked the
DP participants by the number of their correct “know” responses
and separately ranked the controls in the same manner. We
then matched each DP participant with their respectively ranked
control participant, and reduced the number of trials for each
DP participant to that of their matched control participant. The
selection of which trials to remove was decided at random by
a Python script. This was possible for 7 of the DP cases; one
control participant had more correct “know” responses than their
matched DP case, in this instance, the control participant had
their trial numbers reduced to match the DP participant. These
analyses revealed the same pattern of results.
These results suggest that when making recognition judg-
ments, the DP group process faces using a neural pathway com-
monly associated with words, objects and pictures (e.g., Curran,
2000; Maratos et al., 2000; Tsivilis et al., 2001; Duarte et al., 2004;
Groh-Bordin et al., 2006). Familiarity in DP thus appears to be
driven by this object related recognition pathway. The controls,
however, exhibit no evidence that they process faces using this
route, instead it appears that they use routes commonly associated
with intact face recognition abilities (Yovel and Paller, 2004;
MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007).
DISCUSSION
We examined recognition memory for previously unknown faces
in both control participants and individuals with DP. Previous
research has identified face recognition impairments in indi-
viduals with DP (e.g., Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006), but
we are not aware of any previous attempts to assess the roles
of familiarity and recollection for recognition performance in
this group. We used an R/K recognition memory paradigm to
measure the relative contributions of recollection, inferred from
“remember” responses, and familiarity, inferred from “know”
responses, to recognition memory for faces. We also obtained
EEG recordings to identify the neural mechanisms involved in
recognizing recently encountered faces in these two groups. We
found that individuals with DP exhibited a variety of behav-
ioral deficits in recognition memory and also differed in their
electrophysiological response to test stimuli from individuals
with normal face processing abilities. Specifically, in individ-
uals with DP we observed (a) a relatively low proportion of
“remember” responses and corresponding high proportion of
“know” responses (suggestive of low levels of recollection); (b) a
relatively high proportion of false alarms; (c) an apparent lack of
a posterior familiarity ERP old/new effect commonly associated
with faces as evidenced by similar waveforms for correct “know”
responses and correct rejections across all time windows; (d) the
appearance of a frontal “know” ERP old/new effect commonly
associated with familiarity for objects, pictures and words (but
not faces); and (e) a delay in the appearance of a recollec-
tion related ERP old/new effect as evidenced by ERPs for trials
with correct “remember” responses only appearing more positive
than those for trials with correct rejections in the later time
window.
BEHAVIORAL FINDINGS
In agreement with previous research we found that individuals
with DP have a general impairment for recognizing faces when
compared to controls. This impairment was driven by a decreased
ability to correctly identify a previously seen face, but also through
difficulties in correctly identifying a previously unknown face as
new; these problems drive the DP group’s diminished capacity to
discriminate old from new faces in comparison to the controls.
For control participants this task was very easy as evidenced by
their extremely high discriminability score, whereas individuals
with DP exhibited considerable difficulties, especially for “know”
responses which did not discriminate at all between old and new
items. Controls identified faces on the basis of recollection in the
vast majority of trials, utilizing familiarity much less frequently,
as indicated by their relatively high proportion of “remember”
rather than “know” responses. Conversely, among individuals
with DP the proportions of correct “remember” and “know”
responses were about equal. Even though individuals with DP
exhibited a much higher false alarm rate than controls, both
groups made predominantly “know” responses in this category,
suggesting that the similar proportion of correct “remember”
and “know” responses in individuals with DP might reflect a
specific impairment in recollection rather than a general inability
to distinguish between “remember” and “know” responses.
Dual process models of recognition memory purport that
familiarity is a faster process than recollection (Yonelinas, 2002),
and as such one would expect “know” responses to be faster than
“remember” responses—a pattern opposite to that we observed.
This discrepancy, however, can be explained by the quality of
the distinct phenomenological experiences of recollection and
familiarity. It is entirely possible that “remember” and “know”
response times do not accurately reflect the actual temporal
activation of recollection and familiarity, but rather the speed
with which a participant can be confident enough to make a
decision (Dewhurst and Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 2006).
For example, a participant might respond “remember” the instant
a contextual detail is recollected due to the strength of evidence
associated with this information. On the other hand, a feeling
of familiarity without context may require extra time to elicit a
“know” response. Under these circumstances, the dual process
model’s assumption that familiarity is activated earlier than rec-
ollection is still compatible with the behavioral results of faster
remember response times observed with the R/K procedure. It
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should be noted that it is remarkable that any RT differences exist
at all; participants could only make a recognition response during
a prompt screen which appeared after the face had already been
displayed onscreen for 2000 ms.
What reasons could there be for the above differences between
those with DP and normal face processing abilities? One expla-
nation might be that of facial distinctiveness, or at least perceived
facial distinctiveness, affecting recognition. Previous research has
suggested that remember responses are primarily influenced by
the distinctiveness of a face, with increasing distinctiveness lead-
ing to more recollected experiences (Dewhurst et al., 2005).
Increasing distinctiveness has also been indicated as causing
fewer false alarms (Light et al., 1979). It has been shown that
some individuals with DP display random patterns when rat-
ing distinctiveness (Carbon et al., 2010), thus DP cases might
have an inability to pick up on the subtle cues from a face
that aid recollection. While those with DP possibly appear inca-
pable of deciding distinctiveness in a similar fashion to con-
trols, it would be interesting to see if distinctiveness, at least
with regard to how those with DP perceive it, could influ-
ence later recognition performance. For example, is subsequent
recognition performance for faces rated as distinctive at study
by individuals with DP more accurate compared to faces rated
as not distinctive, and if so, is this generally through the use
of recollection? If recollection is primarily aided by distinctive-
ness, and that those with DP are incapable of making reli-
able distinctiveness judgments, then it does raise the question
on what “remember” responses in individuals with DP are
based. It might be interesting to see if other factors identified
in face recognition are being used by those with DP, such as
attractiveness, memorability, typicality or how much each face
reminds them of someone they already know (Dewhurst et al.,
2005).
Increasing usage of familiarity in discrimination tasks has
been linked with face typicality, that is, how much a face looks
like an average face (Vokey and Read, 1992; Dewhurst et al.,
2005). Typicality and distinctiveness have been proposed to be
opposite ends of a continuum upon which faces can be found
(Johnston et al., 1997). Valentine (1991) formalized this idea into
a face-space model, a multidimensional space whereby faces are
located dependent upon their characteristics, at the center of
which is an average, or typical, exemplar face. Faces that appear
to be more typical, or lacking in distinctive features, are grouped
around the center of this space, whereby the increased density and
similarity of the faces in this area makes it much more difficult to
discriminate between them. These faces are suggested to increase
familiarity recognition judgments for studied and unstudied faces
due to familiarity. Faces found further away from this center, those
that are more distinctive, are much less susceptible to false alarms
and are increasingly identified by recollection (Dewhurst et al.,
2005).
The DP group’s low discriminability scores and increased
usage of familiarity suggests that face-spaces for individuals with
DP are smaller than those in individuals with normal face pro-
cessing abilities, effectively leading to faces being closer to the
center. This would suggest some testable predictions: because the
space within which individuals with DP place faces is diminished
when compared to controls, those with DP should therefore be
less susceptible to the face-space effects found in recollection
and familiarity when faces are either morphed to appear more
average or distinctive. For example, in those with intact face
recognition abilities we should find large increases in recollection
if we caricatured faces to make them appear more distinctive
and fewer false alarms to such faces. In theory, the magnitude of
these effects should be diminished, or possibly non-existent, in
DP. Similarly, it should be possible to induce DP-like recognition
memory behavior in those with intact face processing skills if
we averaged faces to make them appear more typical. It would
be interesting to see if doing so would then cause the electro-
physiological signatures of recollection and familiarity in those
with intact face recognition abilities to appear more similar to
those observed in individuals with DP. Two studies have found
some normal face-space effects in DP (Nishimura et al., 2010;
Susilo et al., 2010) however the lack of a recognition memory
paradigm measuring the contributions of recollection and famil-
iarity in either experiment would suggest the need for further
research.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL FINDINGS
The electrophysiological results for the control participants repli-
cate previous research (Yovel and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie and
Donaldson, 2007) in finding anterior and posterior old/new
effects for “remember” responses and only posterior effects for
“know” responses. Taking “remember” responses as an index of
recollection, and “know” responses as an index of familiarity, rec-
ollection ERP old/new effects in the controls appeared generally
to occur over anterior and posterior sites in the 300–500 ms and
over posterior sites in the 500–700 ms time windows. Familiarity
ERP old/new effects appeared only over LP sites in both time win-
dows. We also found ERPs for “remember” responses to be more
positive over right hemisphere regions than those for “know”
responses (which were indistinguishable from those for correct
rejections). In the controls, the complete lack of an anterior
familiarity effect similar to that typically found for objects and
words (e.g., Curran, 2000; Maratos et al., 2000; Tsivilis et al.,
2001; Duarte et al., 2004; Groh-Bordin et al., 2006) suggests that
such effects in other studies using face stimuli (e.g., Curran and
Hancock, 2007) might be driven by features that are not central
to faces such as hair, clothing, jewelry, and other objects also
present in the stimuli. Furthermore, we also found agreement
with previous research that recollection related activity for faces
was greater than that of the activity associated with familiarity
(Yovel and Paller, 2004; MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007), at least
with regard to the right hemisphere.
The lack of recollection effects in the 300–500 ms time window
for participants with DP could be due to a general delay in the
neural processing of face stimuli relative to the control group.
Parietal recollection old/new effects for objects and words gen-
erally do not become apparent until 500 ms after stimulus onset
(e.g., Maratos et al., 2000; Tsivilis et al., 2001), so if individuals
with DP processed faces like other objects, we would not expect a
recollection effect earlier than 500 ms after stimulus onset. ERPs
for correct “remember” responses, however, look qualitatively
similar between the two groups which would be inconsistent
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with the delayed neural processing of face stimuli in our DP
group. Alternatively, it might be the case that the recollection
old/new effect in the 300–500 ms time window for the control
group is distinct from the corresponding effect in the later time
window. Whereas the early and late effect have commonly been
assumed to both index recollection (Yovel and Paller, 2004), it has
been suggested that the early parietal effect might instead index
familiarity (MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007). It seems plausi-
ble that feelings of familiarity precede or at least coincide with
recollection, and the early correct “remember” ERP positivity we
observed over the left hemisphere of control participants may
thus reflect that of a familiarity signal. The absence of this ERP
positivity in individuals with DP could be related to their lack of
posterior ERP old/new effect for “know” responses: both could
index a lack of familiarity for previously studied faces. Consistent
with this explanation is the fact that early correct “remember” and
“know” ERP waveforms are virtually identical over the LP region
for control participants.
Looking at the later time window, we see a clear recollection
ERP old/new effect in the DP cases, one that is similar topograph-
ically and in magnitude to that of the controls, at least over the
RP region. This suggests that the phenomenological experience
of recollecting a face in individuals with DP is intact despite
the drastically reduced proportion of “remember” responses in
this group. Dual process theories that view recollection as an all-
or-nothing process (e.g., Yonelinas, 1994) would predict similar
effect sizes for effects due to recollection. Despite the recollection
old/new effect between the two groups appearing to be of similar
magnitude over the right parietal region, the fact that no old/new
effects were found over other scalp locations might suggest a
quantitatively weaker recollection signal in those with DP. This
lends tentative support to the proposal that recollection could
be a graded, as opposed to discrete, process as suggested by
some theories of recognition memory (Wixted, 2007; Wixted and
Mickes, 2010).
In the present paradigm, we relied upon participants’ own
self-generated details for recollection. There might be a concern
that this method does not index recollection commonly expe-
rienced in the real world, such as that for names, occupations
or places. The Yovel and Paller (2004) study found recollection
ERP old/new effects related to self-generated details surrounding
a face to be qualitatively similar to that of occupations; these
recollection old/new effects were also topographically similar to
those found here. This would suggest that recollection of self-
generated information attached to a face is the same as seman-
tic information provided from external sources. MacKenzie and
Donaldson (2007), however, found a larger old/new effect when
names were recollected in comparison to self-generated details.
It would therefore be of interest to see whether the recollection
deficits observed here in our DP group would continue to be
observed when an objective measure of recollection, such as
a name, is employed; if names were no different from other
semantic information, then we should observe similar behavioral
and electrophysiological abnormalities in DP to those observed
for recollection here.
The face related posterior familiarity old/new effect, how-
ever, appears to be absent in the DP group, suggesting that the
subjective experience leading to “know” responses might differ
between the two groups. While those with intact face recognition
clearly exhibit a posterior ERP old/new effect when experiencing
familiarity for faces, those with DP appear to engage a famil-
iarity route more commonly associated with object, picture and
word recognition towards the front of the scalp. This is to our
knowledge the first clear evidence that individuals with DP are
not processing faces using a specialized, face-specific pathway, but
are instead using a route more commonly associated with general
objects. Even more interesting is that this pathway appears to
be engaged by the DP group during all recognition judgments,
as evidenced by the qualitative similarities between the three
different correct response ERP waveforms at the frontal region.
The ERP waveforms exhibited by the controls in all response
categories were qualitatively different in comparison to the DP
group, so much so that the correct “know” old/new effect was
actually more negative in amplitude in the control group. This
finding was a reversal of the correct “know” old/new effect found
in the DP group at the same site. It thus appears that an attempt
is made to engage the object familiarity process in parallel with
the face related recollection experience in DP. These results offer
an exciting insight as to why those with DP might be experiencing
problems when trying to recognize a face; a face is not treated
entirely as special, but also processed using a generic, object
related pathway in the brain.
Some authors (e.g., Yovel and Paller, 2004) have suggested that
the parietal familiarity and recollection old/new effects are reliant
on similar neural generators, thus implying that recollection
and familiarity are merely quantitatively different strengths of
the same signal. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that
the frontal familiarity old/new effect merely reflects conceptual
priming (Yovel and Paller, 2004; Paller et al., 2007; Voss et al.,
2012) due to the existence of a base level of meaning for stimuli
such as words (Maratos et al., 2000) and everyday objects (e.g.,
Duarte et al., 2004) in recognition memory experiments. The dis-
sociation between the parietal familiarity and recollection effects
in those with DP, and the appearance of the frontal familiarity
effect commonly associated with objects and words, lends support
to the proposal that the posterior familiarity and recollection
old/new effects for faces are being driven by dissociable processes.
Further to this, that previously novel faces, stimuli highlighted
as not susceptible to the conceptual priming problem (Yovel
and Paller, 2004), should elicit a frontal familiarity effect in the
DP group suggests that the conceptual priming hypothesis is
incorrect. Instead, our results would appear to add support to
the notion that the mid-frontal ERP effect does actually index a
generic familiarity process.
An alternative view, however, might be able to reconcile our
data with the conceptual priming hypothesis. Voss and Paller
(2007) found that the magnitude of the mid-frontal old/new effect
increased in response to increasing ratings of meaningfulness
for shapeless blobs; this supports the view that the mid-frontal
old/new effect is merely an index of conceptual priming. If our
DP cases are not entirely processing faces as faces through typical
routes, as evidenced by the lack of a parietal familiarity old/new
effect, then it might be the case that they are attempting to find
some form of meaning in the faces instead. By trying to find
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some meaningful way to examine the faces, rather than treating
them merely as faces, our DP participants might therefore be
rating faces as familiar on the basis of conceptual priming. Our
data would therefore still be compatible with the conceptual
priming hypothesis if this were found to be the case. Regardless
of the underlying neural cause of the mid-frontal old/new effect,
it would appear that this pathway is driving familiarity based
recognition judgments in our DP group.
It should be noted that although not significant, the topo-
graphical figures and waveforms do appear to hint at a possible
familiarity effect in the DP group that is qualitatively similar to the
controls, albeit hugely dissipated. The lack of differences between
correct “know” and correct rejection waveforms at posterior sites
might be an index of the difficulty that those with DP are finding
at discriminating between the old and new faces; the face related
familiarity signal elicited by a face may be so weak for individuals
with DP in comparison to the controls that it is incapable of
creating a large enough effect in the waveforms to be statistically
apparent here. Maybe due to this weakness in the face-specific
familiarity route, those with DP then engage the more general
object and word familiarity route to aid recognition.
No previous recognition memory study for faces has found
a modulation of this parietal familiarity effect. This occurrence
in the present study suggests that familiarity for faces could be
modulated in a similar way to the anterior familiarity effect seen
for objects and words. Future research could employ experimental
manipulations to uncover whether these familiarity effects can be
modulated through increasing levels of familiarity or confidence.
Another possibility could be that familiarity for faces is linked
to the same underlying process that detects distinctiveness in
faces; the fact that those with DP might be incapable of making
distinctiveness judgments in a similar fashion to those with intact
face processing abilities (Carbon et al., 2010) could be due to
the fact that they are utilizing an object/word route to make
such judgments. The nature of the parietal face related familiarity
effect has been largely ignored by recognition memory researchers
and is an area ripe for study, not only in DP, but also in those
with intact face processing abilities. Combined with experimental
manipulations of facial distinctiveness, they could provide inves-
tigators with a powerful framework within which to elucidate the
possible causes of recognition deficits in DP.
CONCLUSIONS
The present study examined recognition memory for previously
unknown faces in DP using an R/K paradigm. From our findings
it is clear that there are a range of abnormalities in recogni-
tion memory for faces in individuals with DP. These findings
supply compelling evidence that future DP researchers should
take the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity into
consideration when designing studies investigating face recog-
nition. Our electrophysiological results give the first clear evi-
dence that individuals with DP process faces like other objects
and we propose that the associated impairments in performance
may be related to difficulties in judging distinctiveness and/or
typicality of previously unknown faces (Carbon et al., 2010).
This finding would not have been apparent from the behav-
ioral results alone and highlights the importance of combining
different approaches when investigating face recognition deficits
in DP.
The present research also has important implications when
diagnosing, and testing treatments of, DP. Further work is
required to discover the extent to which those with DP and
normal face recognition abilities are utilizing familiarity and
recollection when completing the widely used CFMT; a primary
tool for diagnosing DP. Around half of all individuals that contact
us reporting problems with faces fail to meet the criteria for a
diagnosis of prosopagnosia when using the CFMT. The CFMT
simply asks participants to pick out a target face from a choice
of three faces, with no measure as to how this decision was
made. The basis on which those with intact face recognition
abilities are identifying faces on the CFMT is as yet unknown,
although one could imagine it is primarily through the use of
recollection. Those that meet the criteria for a diagnosis on the
CFMT might be more reliant on, as our study has demonstrated,
a weakened recollection signal and abnormal familiarity route. It
is possible that the individuals that report problems with faces,
yet fail to meet a diagnosis, might be in some as yet undetected
group exhibiting quantifiably distinct recognition processes. If
we were to incorporate the R/K or confidence response options
into the CFMT, we might find differences between those who
report problems yet score within the normal range on the
CFMT and others who report no such difficulties. Our find-
ings provide new insights into recognition memory for faces in
DP and should guide future research and attempts to improve
diagnosis.
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